A good way the fresh new Congress you’ll constrain the dimensions of such equilibrium sheet sets will be to replace the composition away from Fannie’s and you will Freddie’s home loan financial support because of the restricting the fresh new buck level of their debt prior to the buck number of mortgage loans securitized and kept by the almost every other buyers. Though it is difficult knowing how best setting such as for example a guideline, this approach manage consistently expand this new depth and you may exchangeability of mortgage segments by way of home loan securitization however, do eradicate the potential general risks in the these types of GSEs. If at all possible eg a ratio carry out appeal the business procedures regarding Fannie and Freddie into improvement out of supplementary avenues rather than to your this new bring of implicit subsidy. 3
With the earliest strategy, Fannie and you can Freddie try relieved of interest-rate chance however they are nevertheless confronted by credit chance as they guarantee MBS traders resistant to the exposure one to certain residents usually standard on fundamental mortgage loans
Limiting your debt out of Fannie and you may Freddie and you will growing its character when you look at the home loan securitization might possibly be consistent with the completely new congressional intent why these establishments give balances searching for home-based mortgage loans and supply liquidity to have financial traders.